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INTRODUCTION
Can a person harbor discriminatory views toward protected
minority groups, yet still hire a member of that minority group as an
employee? That is the question at the heart of the common actor
inference in Title VII employment discrimination jurisprudence. The
common actor inference holds if the same supervisor hires an
employee from a protected minority group, and then fires that
employee a short period of time later, there is a strong inference that
discrimination did not factor in the employment decision.1 Because the
burden for proving Title VII discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin lies with the plaintiff, the common
actor inference is a tool employer-defendants can use to defeat Title
VII discrimination claims. However, in the Seventh Circuit’s recent
decision in McKinney v. Sheriff of Whitley County, the court not only
critiqued the district court’s reliance on the common actor inference,
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Perez v. Thornton’s, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2013).
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but also questioned the utility of the inference in Title VII
discrimination cases.2 This comment will argue that the Seventh
Circuit was correct in rejecting the defendant’s use of the common
actor inference in McKinney, and that other circuit courts should
follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead in limiting the common actor
inference to an evidentiary issue that can only be argued to the
ultimate trier of fact at the trial stage of litigation.
The common actor inference is not codified in Title VII nor
any other federal civil rights statute.3 The first mention of a common
actor inference was in the Fourth Circuit decision Proud v. Stone,
which stated, “in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse
action taken by the employer.”4 In Proud, the Fourth Circuit endorsed
the use of the common actor inference at the pleading stage, and
upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
alleging age discrimination.5
The common actor inference has been adopted across all U.S.
Circuit Courts, but its application is not uniform. Some circuits,
including the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth, have adopted the
Fourth Circuit’s use of the common actor inference and apply it to
discrimination claims at the pleading and summary judgment stage.6
Other circuits have limited the scope of the common inference to cases
2

McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866 F.3d 803, 814-15 (7th
Cir. 2017).
3
Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. Quintanilla, The Same-Actor Inference of
Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing
of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. R. 1, 65 (2016).
4
Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
5
Id. at 797-98.
6
See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993);
Cordell v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 331 F.App’x. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009); Waldron v.
SL Industries Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods
Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005); Antonio v. Sygma Network Inc.,
458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
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where there are genuine issues of material fact.7 The Seventh Circuit
has adopted the most narrow application of the common actor
inference, holding that the inference should only be considered by the
ultimate trier of fact and should not be applied in motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment.8 The Eleventh Circuit has taken a
similar approach to the Seventh Circuit.9
Section I of this comment will discuss the background that
preceded the passage of Title VII, employees’ protections under Title
VII, and how a plaintiff brings a Title VII discrimination suit. Section
II will discuss the background of McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of
Whitley County, and how the Seventh Circuit reached its decision to
limit the application of the common actor inference. Section III will
explain why the Seventh Circuit made the right decision and will
argue that other circuits should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach.
I.

TITLE VII HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Title VII Protects Members of Protected Classes from
Employment Discrimination
Federal protections against employment discrimination, known as
the Title VII protections, emerge from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10
The Civil Rights Act was landmark legislation that emerged after a
long, often bloody struggle to achieve equal rights for minorities in the

7

See, e.g., Brown v. CSC Logic Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Wexler
v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003); Kells v. Sinclair
Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other
grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011)).
8
McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866 F. 3d 803, 814-15 (7th
Cir. 2017).
9
Williams v. Vitro Serv. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
10
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.).
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United States.11 The 1963 Civil Rights March in Birmingham,
Alabama, and the horrifically violent response that accompanied it, is
often credited with finally spurring Congress to act to protect certain
employees from discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin.12 Despite fierce debate in Congress, the Act was
politically popular enough to pass by well over 100 votes in the House
of Representatives and with over two-thirds of the members in the
U.S. Senate, enough to defeat a filibuster.13
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits
“employers,” as defined by the Act,14 “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”15 The Act also states an employer
cannot “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”16
Title VII protects employees before and during their relationship
with the employer.17 Before the employment relationship officially
exists, employers may not advertise for a position by indicating they
11

Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action,
and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2001).
12
Id. at 21-22.
13
Id. at 22.
14
With some exception, Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
15
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
16
Id.
17
D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception
Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87,
95-96 (2013).
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prefer to hire employers of a certain class, or that the employer will
not hire a member of a protected class.18 Second, employers cannot
refuse to hire employees for a job because of their status as a member
of a protected class.19 Third, employers may not institute employment
tests or training programs that are designed to discriminate against a
protected class of employees or potential employees.20 Title VII
therefore provides remedies to any person who faces employment
discrimination before the employer-employee relationship begins.21
Title VII also protects employees once their official relationship
with an employer begins. An employer is prohibited from firing an
employee solely because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.22 Employers cannot refuse to assign an employee to certain
duties solely because of their membership in a protected class.23
Employers cannot unfairly segregate or classify their employees at
work because of the employee’s membership in a protected class.24
Employers also cannot promote or refuse to promote an employee
based on their, race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.25
Title VII protects employees who oppose unlawful employment
practices or file a complaint against their employer for discriminatory
practices.26 This includes protections that allow employees to
participate in investigations of their employer for discriminatory
employment practices.27 Title VII prohibits an employer from
retaliating “against any of his employees or applicants for employment
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
18

42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(b) (“class” as used in this sentence means race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin).
19
Greene, supra note 17, at 95.
20
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(d); 2000e-2(h).
21
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
22
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
23
Id.
24
Greene, supra note 17, at 94
25
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
26
Greene, supra note 17, at 95.
27
Id.
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employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”28
Title VII goes beyond merely providing employees with
protection from employment discrimination. It also provides
employees with enforcement provisions and remedies for any
discrimination they may face. Title VII created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which has the power
to investigate, study, intervene, and assist employees who believe they
have been victims of prohibited discrimination by their employer or
potential employer.29 The EEOC is designed to work with state and
local employment enforcement agencies to ensure all claims are
investigated thoroughly.30 The EEOC serves as an enforcement,
investigatory, and regulatory body.31
Title VII also specifically allows the Attorney General to bring an
action against employers for discriminatory employment practices in
United States District Courts.32 Notably, Title VII also contains a feeshifting provision that awards a prevailing plaintiff attorney fees if he
or she can prove employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(m).33
Awards of attorney fees are not the norm in U.S. civil cases, and

28

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (“[i]n the case of any charge filed by a member of the
Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or
political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice
alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek
relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto
upon receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any action with
respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials.”)
31
Id.
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6.
33
42 U.S.C. 2000-e-5(k) (“[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees)
as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
29
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special fee provisions in legislation are a sign that Congress wished to
encourage private lawyers to bring a certain type of litigation.34
B. Bringing a Title VII Claim as a Plaintiff
Based on the preceding section, it would be easy to conclude that
Title VII’s employment protections make it easy for a plaintiff to
prevail on an employment discrimination claim. Title VII defines
forbidden acts employers may not engage in, creates an investigative
and enforcement agency to examine Title VII claims, and provides
incentives to pursue Title VII actions. However, Title VII’s broad
provisions and years of judicial interpretation have made it very
difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on a Title VII claim.
Title VII was never intended to protect an employee from being
discharged or passed over for any reason other than prohibited
discrimination. Title VII does not protect an employee from being
discharged for poor performance, inappropriate work activity, poor
judgment, or disputes with management.35 Title VII’s protections are
thus limited only to cases where the plaintiffs can prove they suffered
an adverse employment action because of their race, religion, color,
sex, or national origin. A Title VII discrimination case over unlawful
termination is thus decided on the limited scope of whether “the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff’s race [religion, color, sex or national origin] . . . caused the
discharge.”36
A plaintiff may prove race discrimination by either direct or
indirect proof, relying on direct or circumstantial evidence.37 Because
direct proof of discrimination is usually present in only the most
blatant cases, most Title VII cases require indirect proof of
34

Jeffrey A. Blevins and Gregory J. Schroedter, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Congress Revamps Employment Discrimination Law and Policy, 80 ILL. B.J. 336,
336 (1992).
35
Hill v. St. Louis University, 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8 th Cir. 1997).
36
Ortiz v. Werner Enter. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).
37
Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012).

358

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 12

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

discrimination.38 In order to “sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination” the United States
Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have developed a distinct
framework demonstrating what a plaintiff needs to prove to prevail on
a Title VII discrimination claim.39 The United States Supreme Court
established a framework, for plaintiffs who are bringing indirect proof
of discrimination, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.40
C. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, an African-American man,
was laid off as part of general workforce reduction by the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation.41 The plaintiff and other workers protested these
firings as racially motivated and staged protests at the McDonnell
Douglas job site.42 After the protests ended, plaintiff noticed
McDonnell Douglas was advertising for open positions, including the
position the plaintiff used to hold.43 McDonnell Douglas declined to
rehire the plaintiff, citing his participation in the protest activities, and
the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC.44 The EEOC found
some cause that McDonnell Douglas had violated Title VII by refusing
to rehire the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then brought an action in the
district court.45 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims,
stating that McDonnell Douglas’s “refusal to rehire respondent was
based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not
on his legitimate civil rights activities” or his race or color.46

38

Id.
Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8 (1981).
40
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41
Id. at 794.
42
Id. at 795.
43
Id. at 796.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 797.
46
Id.
39
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Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision to the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals.47 The Eight Circuit upheld some of the district
court’s decision, but reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint for discriminatory hiring practices against
McDonnell Douglas.48 In explaining its decision to remand, the Eight
Circuit attempted to create a framework for examining Title VII
employment discrimination claims.49 The Eight Circuit stated that
when the district court considered the evidence offered by the plaintiff
and McDonnell Douglas, the district court relied on subjective criteria
which carried little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.50
The court explained that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity
to demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas’s reasons for refusing to
rehire him were mere pretext for discriminatory purposes.51 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to better clarify the Eight Circuit’s
standards for evaluating a plaintiff’s Title VII employment
discrimination claim.52
The Supreme Court created a four-element test for a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case of Title VII prohibited discrimination. The
Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in his hiring, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 1)
he is a member of a racial minority; 2) he applied and was qualified
for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3)
despite his qualifications for the position, he was rejected; and 4) after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applications from persons of plaintiff's qualifications.53 The
47

Id.
Id. at 798.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 802. The McDonnell-Douglas framework is now used for any Title VII
claim where discrimination is alleged, including race, religion, color, sex, or national
origin. See Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87
CALIF. L. R. 983, 985 (1999).
48
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Supreme Court agreed with the Eight Circuit that the plaintiff did
demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination.54
After the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the plaintiff.55 The Supreme Court stated it is not
necessary for an employer to delineate every legitimate reason why an
employer chose to fire or not hire an employee, but makes clear that
any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision
relieves the employer from this burden.56 The inquiry does not end if
the employer demonstrates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the hiring decision. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate through evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision is mere “pretext” to
hide or overshadow a discriminatory reason.57 The Supreme Court
then remanded the case to the district court with the instructions that
the plaintiff’s case should be evaluated with the tests stated in this
decision, in what came to be known as the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.58
McDonnell Douglas is an example of the Supreme Court creating
a test that the district courts and circuit courts can follow when
interpreting and applying legislation from Congress. It also
demonstrated the burdens a plaintiff carries in proving a Title VII
discrimination case. The plaintiff not only carries the initial burden of
proving a prima facie case, the plaintiff must also have sufficient
evidence to prove that any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the
employer offers for its decision is mere pretext for a discriminatory
purpose.

54

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
Id. at 802-803.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 807.
58
Id.
55
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D. Introduction of Common Actor Inference as an additional
hurdle to a Title VII claim
The common actor inference is a judicially-created inference that
weighs against the plaintiff in a Title VII case. The common actor
inference developed after the Supreme Court established the
McDonnell Douglas framework and is a way to help the judge or jury
better apply the framework in a case. It is important to understand at
what point in a Title VII case the common actor inference is
considered, as it varies from circuit to circuit, and the inference can
have a more substantial impact on a Title VII case based on when it is
considered.
The first appearance of the common actor inference was in the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.59 The Fourth Circuit articulated the
test, which is “in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse
action taken by the employer.”60 The Fourth Circuit analyzed the
common actor inference in the context of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, and stated “[t]he relevance of the fact that the employee
was hired and fired by the same person within a relatively short time
span comes at the third stage of the analysis,” when the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason for the employment
action is mere pretext for a discriminatory purpose.61 The court
explained that if the same employer hired and fired the employee in a
relatively short time span, this then “creates a strong inference that the
employer's stated reason for acting against the employee is not
pretextual.”62
U.S. Courts of Appeals vary on what stage of litigation is
appropriate to consider the common actor inference. There are
59

Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id.
61
Id. at 798.
62
Id.
60
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typically three ways a Title VII race discrimination case can reach a
final judgment: 1) an order dismissing the complaint; 2) summary
judgment before the case reaches the ultimate trier of fact; or 3) a final
judgment rendered after trial to a judge or jury.63 In Proud v. Stone, the
Fourth Circuit considered evidence of the common actor inference
when considering a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VII
complaint. Because a motion to dismiss is based solely on the
pleadings, the Fourth Circuit established that the common actor
inference can apply before the litigation moves to the fact-finding
stage.64 A majority of the other circuit courts have followed the
Fourth Circuit’s precedent and allow courts to consider the common
actor inference when evaluating a plaintiff’s claim in a motion to
dismiss or in a summary judgment motion.65 Other circuits have
limited the application of the common actor inference to only when
discrimination has been alleged and there are genuine issues of
material fact.66 However, in McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley
County, the Seventh Circuit limited the application of the common
actor inference to the narrowest of circumstances, and stated its
concern that the common actor inference may be “outgrow[ing] its
usefulness” in Title VII jurisprudence.67

63

See Nana Gyimah-Brempong, Tahl Rabino & Neonu Jewell, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 587 (2002).
64
Stone, 945 F.2d at 798.
65
See Cordell v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 331 F.App’x. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009);
Waldron v. SL Industries Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Coghlan v. Am.
Seafoods Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005); Antonio v. Sygma
Network Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
66
See, e.g., Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir.
2003); Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2000)
(abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th
Cir. 2011)).
67
McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty, 866 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir.
2017).
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MCKINNEY V. OFFICE OF SHERIFF OF WHITLEY COUNTY
A. Factual Background and District Court Decision

Sheriff Mark Hodges of Whitley County, Indiana, hired Terrance
McKinney as a full-time merit officer on August 5, 2013.68 McKinney
was the first-ever black officer in Whitley County.69 The merit officer
position carries a one-year “probationary period” where the officer can
be fired at the sole discretion of the Sheriff, without input from the
county merit review board.70 The purpose of the probationary period is
to allow a sheriff to determine if a new officer is capable of
performing his or her duties before he or she benefits from state law
that requires “good cause” for termination, as well as the law’s
procedural protections.71
Because McKinney would have been the first black officer in
Whitley County history, Sheriff Hodges and McKinney discussed
McKinney’s race during the interview.72 McKinney stated that he did
not expect that he would experience racial discrimination at the
Sheriff’s Office.73 However, throughout his employment, McKinney
was able to point to specific instances when he was subjected to racist
or discriminatory words and actions by his fellow officers. McKinney
related that one officer used the “n-word” in front of him, that officers
joked about ordering their coffee “like him,” and that certain officers
would not train him or even speak to him.74 Sheriff Hodges
recommended that McKinney watch the movie 42, which depicts
Jackie Robinson’s battle to break the color barrier in baseball, and told
him the movie would “help him out.”75
68

Id. at 805.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
69
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On May 15, 2014, Sheriff Hodges fired McKinney, invoking the
power he had as Sheriff under the “probationary period.”76 Sheriff
Hodges’ termination letter listed three reasons for firing McKinney: 1)
submitting false work hours while attending the Indiana Law
Enforcement Academy; 2) violating standard operating procedure for
filing complete monthly reports; and 3) violating standard operating
procedure for fueling county vehicles.77 The Whitley County Board of
Commissioners added more reasons for McKinney’s firing in a
termination letter sent four days after McKinney’s firing, including
damaging a county vehicle, failing to complete a transport, and failing
to follow verbal instructions.78
After McKinney was terminated, he brought suit against the
Office of the Sheriff of Whitley County and Deputy Sheriff Tony
Helfrich in the District Court, alleging several theories, including race
discrimination in violation of Title VII.79 In the course of the defense,
counsel for the Sheriff’s office offered even more reasons for
McKinney’s firing, including texting while driving, crashing a county
vehicle, and being late while transporting a juvenile to court.80 After
pleadings were filed and discovery was completed, the Sheriff’s office
moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, McKinney had failed to allege a prima facie case
of discrimination in order to successfully meet the burden-shifting
requirement.81 The defense relied on an affidavit from Sheriff Hodges,
which stated the reasons why McKinney was fired, and did not include
any mention of McKinney’s race.82
The district court ultimately ruled for the defense and granted
summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office.83 The court ruled that
76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 806.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77
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McKinney failed to present any direct evidence of discrimination.84
The court also stated McKinney could not point to any direct evidence
that would constitute a genuine issue of material fact.85 The court
further determined that McKinney failed to meet the Sheriff’s
legitimate employment expectations, based largely upon the Sheriff’s
affidavit.86 The court also based its decision upon the “strong
presumption against finding discrimination when the same person
hires and fires a plaintiff-employee.”87 The district court stated “[i]f
Sheriff Hodges wanted to discriminate against McKinney based on his
race, he could have refused to hire him in the first place.”88
B. 7th Circuit Decision in McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of
Whitley County
McKinney appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel consisting of Judges Bauer, Posner,
and Hamilton unanimously reversed the district court’s decision.89
After a review of the factual and procedural background of the case,
the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by examining McKinney’s
presentation of evidence and the Sheriff’s stated reasons for firing
McKinney.90 The Seventh Circuit utilized the elements of prima facie
case of race discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas framework in
analyzing the district court’s decision.91
First, the court examined whether McKinney had met the
elements for a prima facie case of race discrimination, whether: 1) he
is a member of a racial minority; 2) his job performance met the
employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) he suffered an adverse
84
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employment action; and 4) another similarly situated individual who
was not in the protected class was treated more favorably than him.92
The court noted that it was undisputed that McKinney is a member of
a protected class and that he suffered an adverse employment action.93
The court stated that for McKinney to prevail under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, he must present sufficient evidence to show that
his performance met the Sheriff’s legitimate employment expectations
and that other similarly situated employees who are not in the
protected class were treated more favorably.94
The court evaluated the weight of the evidence presented by both
sides, noting that the Sheriff’s Office offered plausible rationales for
why McKinney did not meet the Sheriff’s legitimate employment
expectations.95 However, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district
court did not give sufficient weight to McKinney’s evidence.96 The
Seventh Circuit ruled the district court failed to properly consider
McKinney’s legal memorandum, the genuine issues of material fact he
raised, and the supporting evidence that he offered to show he met the
Sherriff’s legitimate employment expectations. The Seventh Circuit
particularly focused on “the sheer number of rationales the defense has
offered for firing plaintiff and the quality and volume of the evidence
plaintiff has collected to undermine the accuracy and even the honesty
of those rationales.”97
The court examined the Sheriff’s stated reasons for the firing: 1)
falsifying hours; 2) missing his monthly reports; 3) and misusing the
gasoline credit card.98 After a very thorough review of the Sheriff’s
evidence and McKinney’s evidence, the court found that McKinney
had presented sufficient evidence to at least raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Sheriff’s stated reasons for his
92
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termination were “pretext” for discriminatory actions.99 The court then
pointed out that the Sheriff’s office had offered even more
explanations for McKinney’s termination after it became clear that
McKinney intended to sue for discriminatory employment practices.100
The Seventh Circuit examined each of these additional reasons, and
also found that the plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence in response
to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework and avoid summary
judgment.101
The Seventh Circuit reminded the district court that when
evaluating McKinney’s evidence under the McDonnell Douglas
framework on a summary judgment motion, the question is “simply
whether McKinney’s evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the plaintiff’s race . . . caused the discharge.”102 The
court concluded that after evaluating McKinney’s testimony,
interrogatory answers, internal department documents, and other
evidence, McKinney more than satisfied his burden under McDonnell
Douglas, and that McKinney had presented enough evidence to permit
a reasonable factfinder to question whether the Sheriff’s stated reasons
for firing were pretext for discriminatory actions.103 As a result, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the Sheriff’s Office, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.104
The Seventh Circuit also took time to criticize the district court
for “overestimat[ing] the strength of the ‘common actor’ inference.”105
The district court cited the common actor inference as further proof of
its decision, holding that if the Sherriff had wanted to discriminate
against McKinney, the Sherriff would have refused to hire him in the

99
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first place.106 The district court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s
explanation of the common actor inference in previous cases such as
EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Medical Center, which led the
district court to believe that the common actor inference applied at the
pleading or summary judgment stage of a Title VII case.107 In
McKinney, however, the court seemed to walk back some of its
position in Our Lady of Resurrection, stating that “this inference is not
a conclusive presumption and . . . it should be considered by the
ultimate trier of fact rather than on summary judgment or the
pleadings.”108 The common actor inference may be argued to a jury or
judge in a fact-finding endeavor, but it is not a conclusive presumption
that applies as a matter of law.109 The inference is “just something for
the trier of fact to consider.”110
The court further stated “[w]e have tried to impose limits on the
common actor inference to ensure it does not outgrow its
usefulness.”111 While the court acknowledged that it may be helpful to
let the jury hear evidence of the common actor inference and weigh
the inference in the case before it, the court stated the inference is
helpful only “in some limited situations.”112 Yet, the court continued
that “[t]here are many other occasions, however, where it is unsound
to infer the absence of discrimination simply because the same person
hired and fired the plaintiff-employee.”113
As an example of such a situation, the court pointed out that an
employer may need to quickly fill a position, and as a result hire an
individual from a protected class because the supervisor had no other
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choice.114 Once other candidates for that position are available,
especially non-minority candidates, the employer could then fire the
minority employee for discriminatory reasons and hire a different
employee from a non-protected class.115 In this circumstance, it would
not be appropriate to assume that the employer did not act in a
discriminatory manner just because he or she hired and fired an
employee from a protected class. Similarly, the court imagined how an
employer could hire a woman, but then refuse to give her a promotion
or a raise for discriminatory purposes.116 The court also pointed out
that an employer could hire a woman, but later fire her once she
became pregnant, which would certainly qualify as a discriminatory
action.117
In the closing paragraph of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit stated
that “examples abound” for why the same employer could hire an
employee with a nondiscriminatory purpose, but then later fire that
same employee with a discriminatory purpose. The court asked the
district court to image a scenario where:
The same supervisor could hire a county’s first
black police officer, hoping there would be no racial
friction in the workplace. But after it became clear
that other officers would not fully accept their new
black colleague, that same supervisor could fire the
black officer because of his race based on a
mistaken notion of the “greater good” of the
department.118
Without expressly stating this is what happened in the case of Officer
McKinney, the Seventh Circuit, at a minimum, demonstrated why the
common actor inference should not be considered in a motion for
114
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summary judgment. There are simply too many plausible scenarios for
why a supervisor may hire, and then later fire, an employee from a
protected class for discriminatory reasons to accord the inference a
significant amount of weight at the pleading or summary judgment
stage of litigation.
McKinney is thus a stark limitation on the common actor inference
in the Seventh Circuit. Although the court presented its holding in
McKinney as a logical extension of its previous Title VII
discrimination and common actor jurisprudence, this is the clearest the
Seventh Circuit has been about the application of the common actor
inference. The court definitively stated that the common actor
inference is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of
law.119 Therefore, the inference cannot be considered in a motion to
dismiss or a summary judgment motion.120 The inference is merely a
consideration that the ultimate fact-finder, whether a judge or a jury,
may weigh when making a decision. The Seventh Circuit thus
presented a very narrow definition and use of the common actor
inference.
III. ANALYZING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COMMON ACTOR
INFERENCE

A. Seventh Circuit exposes logical flaws and uses negative tones
when addressing the common actor inference
The Seventh Circuit’s McKinney decision is notable for both the
ease with which the Seventh Circuit found logical flaws in the
common actor inference and the almost dismissive tone the court used
when discussing the inference. After evaluating the approach other
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken toward the common actor
inference, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit took the lead in criticizing
the use of the common actor inference in Title VII cases. This becomes
119
120
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abundantly clear upon a close reading of the court’s legal analysis and
the language it used when discussing the common actor inference.
The Seventh Circuit could have invalidated the district court’s
ruling in McKinney based solely the plaintiff’s evidence, without
addressing the district court’s reliance on the common actor inference.
McKinney appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment; all
the Seventh Circuit needed to find to reverse the district court’s
decision was find a genuine issue of material fact that would require
final adjudication by a judge or jury.121 The court went through the
facts presented to the district court in long and painstaking detail, and
it found many issues of material fact that would be sufficient to reverse
the grant of summary judgment.122 However, the Seventh Circuit went
beyond just invalidating the circuit court’s decision based on genuine
issues of material fact; it devoted an entire section to exposing the
logical flaws in the common actor inference.123
The Seventh Circuit stated that “examples abound” of scenarios
where it would be unsound to infer that the same supervisor hiring and
firing an employee in a short time period did not have a discriminatory
purpose for doing so.124 Although the court stated that examples
abound, it listed only four examples: 1) a supervisor hires an employee
from a protected class out of necessity, then later fires that employee
when members of a nonprotected class are available; 2) a supervisor
who hires a woman, but refuses to promote her because of her gender;
3) a supervisor who hires a woman, but later fires her when she
becomes pregnant; and 4) when a supervisor hires the county’s first
black police officer and then fires him because of racial friction in the
department.125 These are all very clear and easy-to-follow examples of
how the common actor inference can be unsound, and unfairly slanted
toward the supervisor who fires an employee from a protected class.

121

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
McKinney, 866 F.3d at 807-13.
123
Id. at 814-15.
124
Id. at 815.
125
Id.
122

372

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 12

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

However, as the Seventh Circuit suggested, these three examples
are far from the only ones that expose flaws in the common actor
inference. Imagine a supervisor who feels compelled to hire an
employee from a protected class out of a company-wide push to
increase diversity, only to later fire that employee for discriminatory
reasons. Or, consider an all-male law firm who hires female partner to
attract new female clients, only to later fire the female partner because
she does not “fit-in” with the boy’s club culture. One can also think of
a scenario where a supervisor hires a Muslim man or woman, but then
later fires him or her after a domestic terrorist attack because the
supervisor does not want to associate with people of that religion.
These are just a few of a multitude of “examples,” as the Seventh
Circuit said, that demonstrate the inherent flaws of the common actor
inference, and cast doubt on its usefulness or probative value in Title
VII discrimination cases.
It is also important to note the tone the court uses in discussing the
common actor inference in McKinney. The Seventh Circuit opened its
discussion of the common actor inference by stating “the district court
seems to have overestimated the strength of the common actor
inference” in reaching its decision.126 In its very first sentence on the
common actor inference, the Seventh Circuit signaled that the common
actor inference is not an especially strong one because it has been
“overestimated” by the district court.127 The Seventh Circuit then
explained its interpretation of the common actor inference and took the
time to clearly explain to the district court how it improperly applied
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.128 The Seventh Circuit stated that the
district court may have gone astray by relying on older Seventh Circuit
cases such as EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Medical Center, a
1996 case in which the Seventh Circuit implied the common actor
inference could be used in summary judgment motions.129 However, in
McKinney, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that its decisions since Our
126
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Lady of Resurrection have “clarified that this inference is not a
conclusive presumption and that it should be considered by the
ultimate trier of fact rather than on summary judgment or the
pleadings.”130
The court then stated that it has tried to “impose limits on the
common actor inference to ensure it does not outgrow its
usefulness.”131 It refered to inference as “just something for the trier of
fact to consider.”132 It stated that the inference may be helpful “in
some limited situations.”133 The court then provided four clear
examples of when the inference is illogical.134 The combination of the
court’s tone and the narrow application it assigned to the common
actor inference cannot help but the leave the reader with the
impression the court does not look upon the inference with great favor.
In the Seventh Circuit’s own words, the inference is in danger of
“outgrowing its usefulness,” “just” something to be considered, and is
only in helpful in “limited circumstances.” These are not words or
phrases that convey a positive connotation.
B. Circuit Courts should limit the application of the common actor
inference to an evidentiary inference at the trial stage
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s critique of the common actor
inference and its logical flaws, the court did not completely scrap the
use of the common actor inference in the Seventh Circuit.135 Rather,
the Seventh Circuit clearly stated limits on the inference and
proscribes when the inference can be considered. The Seventh Circuit
framed the common actor inference as an evidentiary issue, and it
130
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stated the inference can only considered by the ultimate trier of fact at
the trial stage of litigation.136
There are definite practical implications of the Seventh Court’s
decision in McKinney as it pertains to the common actor inference. A
defendant may not assert the common actor inference as an affirmative
defense; it can only be argued at trial as probative evidence. Therefore,
when a plaintiff brings a Title VII complaint against a defendantemployer, even if the relationship between the plaintiff and supervisor
would implicate the common actor inference, the defendant cannot use
the inference to defeat a complaint in a motion to dismiss or in a
summary judgment motion in the Seventh Circuit.
The court’s decision removed one hurdle a plaintiff must
overcome to successfully plead Title VII discrimination in the Seventh
Circuit. A hypothetical Title VII plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit must
first plead a prima facie case of discrimination: that he or she is a
member of a protected class; that he or she was qualified for the
position; and that he or she suffered an adverse employment action.137
If the plaintiff can successfully plead a prima facie case, then pursuant
to McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.138 At
this stage in the litigation, there would be no reason for the defendant
to assert a common actor inference (even if they could) because
discriminatory acts by the defendant are not considered at this stage.139
If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate through evidence that the employer’s reasons were
“pretext” for a discriminatory purpose.140 It is at this stage that the
plaintiff begins presenting his or her evidence of the employer’s
discriminatory actions.
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Once the plaintiff has offered evidence of the defendant’s
discriminatory acts, other circuit courts will allow the defendant to
introduce the common actor inference to weigh against the plaintiff’s
evidence.141 In Proud v. Stone, the Fourth Circuit stated the fact that
the same supervisor hired and fired an employee “creates a strong
inference that the employer's stated reason for acting against the
employee is not pretextual.”142 The Fourth Circuit recognized the
strong impact this inference has on a plaintiff’s case, and stated “[t]he
plaintiff still has the opportunity to present countervailing evidence of
pretext, but in most cases involving this situation, such evidence will
not be forthcoming. In short, employers who knowingly hire workers
within a protected group seldom will be credible targets for charges of
pretextual firing.”143
The Fourth Circuit’s approach is very favorable to defendants, and
assists defendant-employers in defeating Title VII discrimination
claims before those claims ever reach an ultimate trier of fact. This
scenario occurred in the Indiana district court’s decision, where
McKinney’s complaint was defeated at the summary judgment stage
based in part on the Sheriff invoking the common actor inference.144
However, as the Seventh Circuit demonstrated in its opinion, there are
simply too many flaws in the common actor inference to accord it so
much power at the pleadings or summary judgment stage.145
The Seventh Circuit’s awareness of how the common actor
inference can result in illogical conclusions or too strong of an
advantage for employers led the court to limit the use of the inference
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to only the trial stage of litigation.146 The court stated that “the
common actor inference is a reasonable inference that may be argued
to the jury, but it is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a
matter of law.”147 The court continued that the defendant may argue
the inference to the jury, who may then “weigh it for what it is
worth.”148 The court acknowledged the flaws of the inference when it
is applied as a matter of law at the pleadings or summary judgment
stages, stating “[i]t is misleading to suggest (as some cases do) that the
inference creates a ‘presumption’ of nondiscrimination, as that would
imply that the employee must meet it or lose his case.”149 Thus in the
Seventh Circuit, any employer who wishes to use the common actor
inference as a way to overcome a Title VII discrimination claim may
only do so when arguing to the ultimate trier of fact.150
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit presented the most logical use of the
common actor inference, if it is to be used at all. As this comment has
demonstrated, Congress created Title VII to protect certain American
workers from discriminatory employment actions. The subsequent
judicial interpretations of Title VII created the very rigorous
McDonnell Douglas framework that specifies exactly what a plaintiff
must allege, and eventually prove, in order to succeed on a claim. The
text of Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas framework already
provide defendants with a number of protections against frivolous
claims. Plaintiffs must plead a prima facie case of discrimination
before defendants even need to respond to charges of discrimination.
Defendants then have an opportunity to articulate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment action. Plaintiffs then
146
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must produce actual evidence of discrimination to show that the
defendant’s reasons are merely pretextual. These steps help ensure that
only serious and credible Title VII claims can even advance to the
summary judgment or trial stage.
The inclusion of the common actor inference in pleadings and
summary judgment is an example of how a powerful yet ultimately
flawed judicially-created inference places a significant burden on Title
VII plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit, and those other circuits who have
followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead, have acknowledged that the
common actor inference is a nearly fatal blow to a plaintiff’s claim. A
plaintiff who has met the prima facie elements of Title VII
discrimination and demonstrated discrimination through evidence
should be able to advance to a trial without having to overcome a
defendant-friendly inference that the Seventh Circuit so easily
critiqued.
While the common actor inference can be logical when applied to
the right scenario, it contains too many easily-identifiable flaws that
tip the scales towards a defendant. Therefore, the inference should not
be considered before reaching the ultimate trier of fact. At the trial
stage, the ultimate trier of fact will have the chance to survey all of the
evidence presented, including the common actor inference, and will be
able to weigh the evidence as the he or she sees fit. Applying the
common actor inference before the trial robs the plaintiff of the chance
to argue all of its evidence, and ultimately can lead to judgment for the
defendant for less than solid reasons.
U.S. Circuit Courts should follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead and
limit the application of the common actor inference only to the trial
stage. McKinney’s guidance on the common actor inference will
achieve Congress’ goal of protecting Americans from discrimination
based on their race, sex, religion, color, or national origin, while also
protecting defendants from frivolous claims by plaintiffs. The
framework for a Title VII claim is well-established and fair, and
protects both plaintiffs and defendants equally with a rigid burdenshifting test. The common actor inference disrupts this framework by
shifting the scales too far toward the defendant, and as a result it
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should be limited in accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
McKinney.
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